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Abstract 
The principle that theories should be tested by the accuracy of 
their predictions but not by the realism of their assumptions 
needs to be qualified.  As a practical matter we often need to 
evaluate the of applicability theories to cases for which they 
have not been tested by their predictions. Here we rely on the 
fact that theories are applicable only within a specific domain. 
In determining whether a specific case, which for which no direct 
tests are available is within the theory's  domain, we look 
primarily at whether the assumptions of the theory are as 
applicable to it as they are to the cases for which the theory has 
been successfully tested. 
Key words: realism of assumptions, rationality assumption, domain 
of theories. 
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/ The Domain of Theories and Tests of the Realism of Assumptions 
Thomas Mayer* 
The leading justification that economists give for the unrealism 
of their assumptions is Friedman's  precept that one should test 
theories only by the accuracy of their predictions and not by the 
realism of their assumptions. Elsewhere (Mayer,  1995, Ch. 7),  I 
have advocated a moderate versions of this precept. Here I argue 
that it needs to be qualified to take account of the fact that we 
do not test directly the implications of many of our statements, 
and to delineate the domain of those we do test. My focus is on 
the rationality assumption, but the same principle applies also 
to other assumptions. I deal only with positive economics,  and 
not with the readily justifiable rationality assumption made in 
normative economics. 
I. The Domain of Theories 
Theories have limited domains. For example,  quantum theory 
applies only to subatomic particles,  and as yet cannot be fully 
reconciled with relativity theory. Unless the bounds of the 
domain are kept in mind  theories may be used in circumstances 
where they do not apply, and also sometimes it may seem as though 
even correct theories are plagued by disconfirmed implications. 
a  But economists often do not specify the bounds of their theories 
/ 
and hypotheses by stating at least the most important ceteris 
paribus conditions. Instead, they leave it to the reader's 
intuition to interpret the limits.'  For example, although 
neo-classical theory does not make the bound to its domain 
explicit, few economists consider it disconfirmed because someone 
who is asked for the time of day does not demand payment -  the theory is not intended to apply to this type of decision. 
Economists do pay some attention to the domain of hypotheses 
by constructing alternative models that relax one or more 
assumptions of a previous model, But for two reasons that does 
not suffice. First, some assumptions,  such as rational behavior, 
are relaxed only very infrequently, Second, there is the 
difficulty of telling whether these assumptions are met to a 
sufficient degree in the particular situation under discussion. 
What makes this problem worse is that for convenience and 
tractability assumptions are often stated in a stronger form than 
is strictly necessary for the theory to hold (see Mayer, 1995, 
Ch. 7)  Thus, an economist may relax the closed eccnomy assumption 
of a model and show that its results do not hold in an open 
economy, but often she cannot say by how much the results are 
changed if international trade accounts for, say 5 percent of 
GDP. By contrast, a physicist can tell by how much the existence 
of air pressure changes the speed of falling objects. This 
difference is probably due mainly to the limited role that 
experiments play in economics.  As a result, faced with a real 
world problem an economist,  unlike a physicist, may have many 
models in his toolkit, but may not know which one to apply. 
The domain of  OUT theories and hypotheses therefore needs 
more attention, and it is required for the complete statement the 
maintained hypothesis.  It can be delineated in two dimensions. 
An extensive dimension measures the "stretchM  of the hypothesis. 
Does it cover open economies as well as closed ones, does it 
predict that the price level will rise if  the growth rate of money rises by more than 10 percent, or does it predict such an 
increase if the growth rate of money rises by just one percent? 
Sometimes, as in this case, such questions bring out the role of 
the ceteris paribus assumptions. One aspect of the extensive 
dimension is the amount of detail covered. Does the hypothesis 
claim to explain only the behavior of some average of stock 
prices such as the S&P 500, or does it claim to explain also the 
relative prices of individual stocks? 
Then there is the intensive dimension of the domain. How much 
accuracy does the hypothesis claim: does it make quantitative or 
only qualitative predictions, and in the former case to how many 
significant digits is the result stated or intended to be taken 
seriously?  For example, how similar must the prices of certain 
identical commodities be in different countries for the law of 
one price to be considered confirmed? (See McCloskey,  1985,  Ch. 
9) Unless we are told this how can we evaluate an hypothesis by 
the empirical evidence? 
Failure to delimit the domain of  theories both in terms of 
its range of its applicability and in terms of its accuracy may 
be a major reason why so often various empirical studies offer 
seemingly contradictory evidence. Moreover,  even the same piece 
.  of evidence may be read as confirming or disconfirming a theory 
/ 
depending upon its  (undescribed)  domain. And as Zeckhauser  (1986) 
pointed out, failure to specify the limits plays a central role 
in the debate between behavioral and what he calls rationalist 
economists. 
Once one pays attention to tL  domain of theories it becomes 
apparent that testing by the accuracy of assumptions does serve an important function. Consider,  for example,  a test of the 
hypothesis that monopsonistic and oligopsonistic elements play no 
significant role in wage setting. Suppose tests that have been 
undertaken for the automobile,  paper and textile industries 
support this hypothesis. Does this mean that it is also correct 
for, say the airline and restaurant industries? Such questions 
are important because we are interested in the role of 
oligopsonistic wage setting in the economy as a whole, and not 
just in the three industries for which it was tested. So,  we ask 
how representative they are, and we answer this question by 
seeing whether the structure of their labor markets resembles 
that of other industries,  that is if they are located in more 
isolated areas, if their labor force has more firm-specific human 
capital,  etc. But in asking such questions we are testing by the 
applicability, that is the "realism"  of the assumptions of 
monopsonistic wage theory. 
To illustrate the problems created by the need to specify the 
domain of a theory and its relation to testing by the realism of 
assumptions consider the foll-owing  five other problems.  The first 
is a test of Friedman's (1957)  hypothesis that the proportion of 
permanent income saved is independent of the level of permanent 
income. The domain of this hypothesis is relatively clear, all or 
nearly all households. 
/ 
But in the second problem, testing purchasing-power-parity 
theory, one needs to pay more attention to the theory's  domain. 
Should the test verify whether it holds on a month-to-month 
basis, or is its domain confined to periods of several decades? 
A test showing that it does not hold on a weekly basis,  or in highly controlled,  highly autarchic economy even in the long run, 
would not shake anyone's  confidence in this theory. By contrast, 
a demonstration that it does not hold for relatively open 
economies in data covering a century would be fatal for it, 
because we believe that the necessary assumptions for 
purchasing-power theory are much more applicable in the latter 
case than in the former cases. 
A similar issue arises in a third problem, testing efficient 
market theory. Is its domain merely a tendency of yields on 
similar assets to be similar, or is it intended to be the 
law-like generalization that all the relevant information 
available at any one moment is already embodied in all asset 
prices? In the former case one would treat the relatively smooth 
yield curve as an indication that the theory is correct. In the 
latter case one would conclude from the appearance of some 
anomalies, such as systematic excess stock yields in January, 
that the theory is disconfirmed.  The relative smoothness of the 
yield curve does little to support the belief that efficient 
market theory is correct over so large a domain that all assets 
are priced efficiently,  because the latter requires stronger and 
hence less plausible rationality assumptions than the former. 
A fourth problem is the frequent claim about globalization, 
that the world must'now  be treated as essentially a single 
economy. A recent paper  (Ceglowski,  1998) reviewing the 
literature disconfirms this claim by showing that the existence 
of the U.S./Canadian  border does make a difference to commodity 
prices and trade flows. This provides a strong refutation of the 
"one-world"  hypothesis since proximity and shared language, customs and life-styles,  as well as the absence of tariffs, makes 
the assumptions of the one-world hypothesis particularly 
applicable for the U.S.  and Canada. If the law of one price does 
not operate in the U.S-Canad,a  domain,  we would not expect it to 
operate in other international domains either. By contrast,  a 
study that found equally large effects of borders on trade flow 
and price dispersions between the United States and Nepal would 
not be considered nearly as compelling. 
The final problem is a test of the hypothesis that large 
firms with market power will sometimes use predatory pricing to 
drive rivals out of business. Someone who wants to test this 
hypothesis must select a sample of industries to investigate. He 
could pick random sample. However to obtain a strong refutation 
it would be more efficient to select those industries in which 
the hypothesis is particularly plausible.  But the only way to 
pick such cases is to select situations in which the necessary 
assumptions of the hypothesis are met most closely. 
Thus,  although the primary test of a hypothesis is its 
predictive performance, the accuracy of its assumptions still 
plays a role in four of the five situations just discussed, 
because it affects the domain over which the hypothesis is 
treated as subject to testing, and subsequently as confirmed or 
'rejected. This amount to more than a claim that tests by the 
/ 
realism of assumptions are relevant only to the applicability of 
a theory but not to its truth, because a full account of the 
theory should include a statement about its domain. 
Attention to the domain of neo-classical theory has for two 
reasons become more important in recent years. First, the rationality assumption has been more rigorously applied as 
rational expectations theory became the way to do macroeconomics 
(see Russell, 1998) New classical economists have argued 
persuasively that the domain of rational-choice theory should be 
extended to the way expectations are formed. But they are less 
persuasive when they go beyond that and extend the rationality 
assumption to claim that agents know the correct model. The 
adaptive expectations model may, despite its dubious assumption 
that agents do not use all the readily available information,  be 
a better approximation than the assumption that during the sample 
period agents knew a model which had not yet been published. 
Shouldn't  one assume instead that the model held by agents is the 
model that was pervasive at the time,  rather than the new model, 
so that, for example,  someone presenting a monetarist model in 
1965 should have assumed that agents had a Keynesian rather than 
a monetarist set of expectations? Rational expectations theory 
gained persuasive power from a belief that if one assumes fully 
rational behavior for some purposes, one must assume it for all. 
But that is not so because theories have specific domains. 
Insistence that agents know the correct macroeconomic model may 
also have gained currency in macroeconomics from an illegitimate 
analogy with microeconomics.  In the theory of the firm there is a 
reasonable case that!  entrepreneurs know at least as much as 
economists do because they are the ones with hands-on experience, 
and can learn through trial and error. But they have no hands-on 
experience superior to the economist's in macroeconomic 
prediction 
The second factor that has made looking at the rationality assumption particularly important is that it has expanded.its 
reach into other social sciences (see Baron and Hannan,  1994, 
Miller;  1997). That rational income maximization can explain so 
much economic behavior does not necessarily mean that it can also 
explain political choices.  This is currently a much debated issue 
in political ~cience.~  When explaining exchange rates we can 
ignore religious sentiment, when explaining voting behavior that 
is more questionable. Yet rational choice theory has had some 
successes in other fields,  and that strengthens its plausibility 
in economics, the domain in which one would expect it  to perform 
best. 
11. Some Implications for Neo-classical Theory 
The results of predictive tests of neo-classical theory should 
thus be interpreted in the light of the domain of the theory that 
they relate to. That the empirical evidence convincingly shows 
that demand curves slope downward is hardly persuasive evidence 
for the more ambitious predictions of neo-classical theory, such 
as that security markets do not over-react to news,  or that 
workers are concerned only with their real and not their nominal 
wages (cf.  Russell,  1997). In terms of a cliche that is often 
invoked to defend neo-classical theory,  that there are no $5 
bills lying on the pavement allows us to say that there are no 
$50 bills lying there either. But it does not allow us to say 
/ 
there are no $1 bills lying on the pavement. 
This principle also works for and not just against neo- 
classical theory. Suppose the critics of neo-classical theory 
succeed in refuting its claim th-.t  workers care only about real 
wages and not about money wages. That does not refute all of neo-classical theory. It can be saved by shrinking its claimed 
domain. If such an immunizing strategy would have to be used on a 
large scale neo-classical theory would become a degenerative 
research program,  but even in a well developed science an 
occasionally significant restriction of a theory's  domain would 
hardly be surprising. Even i.f  a research program has had to 
retract some of its claims,  it may still provide a greater stock 
of verified, significant claims than do its rivals; one should 
not confuse the level and the rate of change of a theory's 
contribution. That its originators were overly enthusiastic 
should not be held against the current, more modest version of a 
research program. 
111.  Determining the Domain of the Rationality Assumption 
There is little doubt that in some situations the rationality 
assumption is entirely appropriate;  a starving person offered a 
choice between two loaves of bread will choose the larger one. 
But does the domain of rationality extend far enough to meet the 
requirements of Ricardian equivalence? We cannot test 
individually the applicability of the rationality assumption for 
all the numerous statements we want to make. But what we can do 
is to rank these statements by the strength of the rationality 
assumption that they require, and then to test for the upper 
limit to the domaid  of the rationality as~umption.~ 
The term "strength  of the rationality assumption" is 
sometimes hard to interpret. It is easy to think of cases where 
the relative strength of different versions of the assumption is 
unequivocal;  for example, suppose that making the correct 
decision in situation A requires a knowledge of only high-school. algebra, while in situation B  it requires a knowledge of matrix 
algebra. But in many actual cases the decision about which is the 
stronger assumption is more equivocal, and some judgment based 
merely on casual empiricism and intuition may be required. Some 
bases for such a judgment are discussed below. 
If one ranks the required rationality assumptions by their 
strengths one can see the frequent failure to consider the domain 
of the rationality assumption in another light; as a failure to 
distinguish between interpolation and extrapolation. To 
illustrate,  rank the hypothesis by the strength of their required 
rationality assumptions, with 1 denoting the least amount of 
rationality that is required and 10 the most. Suppose that the 
predictions of hypothesis 5 (say, the life-cycle hypothesis of 
consumption) were confirmed.  One can then consider the 
rationality assumptions made by hypotheses 1-4 as justified, but 
cannot argue from the success of hypothesis 5 that the 
rationality assumption used in hypothesis 10 (say Ricardian 
equivalence) is also confirmed. 
The distinction just drawn between interpolation and 
extrapolation does not mean that extrapolation should 
always be avoided. But it does mean that any conclusion based on 
extrapolation needs to be independently confirmed by 
'  direct empirical tests. 
/ 
Another benefit from ranking hypotheses by the strengths of 
their required assumptions (but not just by the strength of their 
rationality assumptions) is that one can then see which anomalies 
are worrisome. If the empirical evidence speaks against 
hypothesis 10,  one can abandon it without fear that if one does so,  one must also abandon hypotheses 1 to 9.  There is no longer 
the Hobson's  choice that some rational expectationists seem to 
insist on: either accept extreme rationality despite the mounting 
evidence against it, or reject the analysis of  economics in terms 
of  rational behavior altoget.her  and turn in your union card as an 
economist. 
IV. Ranking Rationality Assumptions 
Although ranking rationality assumptions by their strengths will 
often involve more or less arbitrary judgment, some plausible 
criteria can be set out. Thus it seems plausible that the 
rationality assumption is more likely to be satisfied when the 
stakes are large. Similarly,  managers of firms in highly 
competitive industries are under more pressure to behave 
rationally than are managers of legally protected monopolies. 
Agents are more likely to act in a rational and self-interested 
fashion in impersonal transactions, such as buying bonds, than 
when making personal loans t.o friends.  Some decisions, such as 
whether to accept a wage-cut.  or take a less prestigious job, 
involve a person's  feelings of self-worth,  and are therefore 
encumbered by strong emotions that may interfere with rational 
decision-making.  In some cases rational decision-making may be 
difficult because of the great foresight it would require. In 
cases where the payLof  f is transparent, e  .g.  buying a 6 ounce 
bottle at $1 or a 12 ounce bottle at $1.50,  decisions are more 
likely to be rational than in more complex cases, e.g.  buying a 3 
ounce bottle at $0.89 or an 8 ounce bottle at $2.39.  Markets with 
highly educated and sophisticated agents (e.g.  bond markets) are 
more likely to show rational behavior than are markets with less educated agents  (e.g.  the market for small CD's)  .  Market outcome:; 
are also more likely to satisfy the rationality criteria when the 
market structure allows rational agents to take advantage of 
mistakes made by less rational agents  (cf.  Russell,  1998, 
Zeckhauser,  1986). 
Whether repetitive or occasional transactions are more likely 
to be rational is not clear. On the one hand, in repetitive  . . 
transactions customers have more experience with and more 
incentive to inform themselves, but on the other hand, habits may 
play a larger role, and they may also have developed emotional 
ties to their trading partners. 
This list of criteria determining the extent of rational 
behavior is probably incomplete, and at least in some cases it 
may be impossible to measure even ordinally the extent to which 
they apply to a particular hypothesis.  Moreover, some may point 
in one direction and some in the other. Nevertheless, it is 
instructive to apply these criteria to two cases, efficient 
market theory,  and the economics of the family. 
V. Efficient Market Theory 
If the rationality assumption is applicable anywhere it should be 
in organized security markets with their typically large 
transactions, competitive structure and impersonal transactions, 
opportunities for arbitrage, and with the important role played 
/ 
by highly sophisticated and educated participants. Concerns 
relating to self-worth are probably no more serious in these 
markets than in many others.  To be sure, successful operations 
require much foresight and pay-offs are not transparent. But 
these are problems that sophisticated agents as envisioned by neo-classical theory should be able to deal with. One would 
theref  ore expect the data to unequivocally confirm efficient 
market theory. But they do not. In his comprehensive survey of 
efficient market theory Stephen LeRoy (1989,  pp. 1595, 1609, 
1611-12, 1613-14) concludes that: 
Most of the evidence accumulated in the nearly 20 
years since ... [I970  when Fama1s  survey seemed to 
confirm the theory] has been contradictory. ... The 
consensus now is that the anomalies pose a serious 
problem that cannot be shrugged off. ... The majority 
of trades appear to reflect belief on part of each 
investor that he can outwit other investors, which is 
inconsistent with common knowledge of rationality. 
... It would seem almost self-evident that the recent 
C1980sI  wave of leveraged buy-outs provides strong 
evidence against market efficiency. The astronomical 
fees to investment bankers that these mergers 
generate are difficult to reconcile with any 
nontautological version of market efficiency, as are 
the stock price gyrations that accompany leveraged 
buy-outs. ...  Finally,  we have the October 19, 1987, 
stock market sell-off ... [Sltock  values dropped half 
a trillion dollars on that single day in the complete 
absence of  news that can plausibly be related to 
market fundamentals. , .. However attractive (to 
economists) capital market efficiency is on 
methodological grounds, it is extraordinarily 
difficult to formulate nontrivial and falsifiable 
implications of capital market efficiency that have 
not in fact been falsified. 
Similarly,  Thomas Russell (1997,  p. 97) reports that: "the 
evidence for inefficient markets, both from time series-data and 
from cross-section data,  is so pervasive that many empirical 
investigators now take seriously the possibility that market 
prices do not reflekt rational behavior." Russell concedes that: 
"These results are not uncontr~versial~~,  and cites Fama and 
French as believing that the apparent failures of the theory can 
be explained by risk variables omitted in the tests. But he goes 
on to say that: 
many investigators now take seriously the possibility that it is necessary to use models of behavior in 
which investors are not fully rational. ... one would 
have to be extremely committed to rationality not to 
agree that in the area of financial economics ... a 
number of important market phenomena are well 
explained by assuming that not all behavior is fully 
rational." (1997,  pp. 88-90). 
All in all, the rationality assumption does not seem to 
perform well in the market for which it is most plausible. That 
would appears to suggest that at least the extensive domain of 
neo-classical economics is so small that it would be hard to 
locate. 
VI. The Family and Other Traditionally Non-Economic Issues 
One would expect the rationality assumption, and hence the 
economic theory based on it, to be much less applicable when 
dealing with issues such as marriage and divorce, racial 
discrimination,  voting behavior and crime, than in dealing with 
the pricing of securities.  In these situations competitive 
pressures are usually less than in security markets, personal 
factors and considerations of self-worth bulk larger, only a 
sma  ller proportion  the participants is highly educated,  great 
foresight is often required, and pay-offs are often opaque, in 
part because of the scarcity of legally enforceable contracts. 
Moreover, (except in the case of racial discrimination) rational 
agents usually cannot profit f!rom the mistakes of less rational 
Bgents and drive them,  out of  t.he market. 
But as the work of  Becker and his students demonstrates, 
economic theory has much to contribute to important questions in 
many of these areas  For example,  Becker, Landes and Michael 
(1977) were able to explain many observed characteristics of 
divorce by using economic theory to show that the probability of divorce is decreased by an increase in the anticipated earnings 
of men, a lesser likelihood of unanticipated events, an increase 
in the number of children,  marriage within one's  own religious, 
educational and I.Q.  groups, and not marrying at a relatively 
early age. To be sure, many of these findings can be explained by 
"common sensert,  but the relevant point here is that they show 
that even in a very personal matter people behave as economic 
theory predicts. 
VII, A Puzzle? 
That efficient market theory appears to fail while the economics 
of the family is a successful research program seems surprising 
at first glance.  One possible explanation is that the conditions 
listed above as determining the suitability of the rationality 
assumption are mistaken,  or that they have been incorrectly 
applied. That seems unlikely. Another possibility is that 
subsequent research will resolve most of the anomalies of 
efficient market theory. That, too, seems,  unlikely. A third 
explanation of the poor performance of efficient market theory is 
that it is due to the failure not of the rationality assumption, 
but of some other assumption. But it is hard to imagine what that: 
assumption could be. 
A fourth, more plausible explanation is that the seeming 
better performance 6f economic theory in explaining family 
behavior than financial market behavior is an illusion because 
different standards are being applied to these topics. Efficient 
market theory had become the standard paradigm in finance,  and 
thus a potentially fruitful target. Numerous anomalies have been 
found and have received much attention. Much less attention is being paid to the fact that the theory also has its important 
successes. We do not (except for the closed-end funds puzzle) 
find almost identical securities that can be expected to provide 
widely divergent yields.  There is a January effect (yields of 
small stocks are higher in January than in other months), but 
January is just one of the twelve months. If one applies 
falsificationist rules, then efficient market theory has been 
disconfirmed. But as a rough heuristic it still works, though 
with some important exceptions. By contrast, the advocates of the 
Beckerian economics of the family cite many examples of the 
theory's successful predictions. In doing so they apply the much 
less strict rules of verificationism. Perhaps, as the economics 
of the family matures and becomes the target of more critics, 
many exceptions will be discovered (see Goldfarb, 1995). In 
other words, efficient market theory is too ambitious because the 
theory claims such a large domain. Its extensive domain is large 
because it tries to explain asset prices in so much detail,  while 
its intensive domain is large because it makes precise 
predictions. By contrast the economics of the family makes 
primarily qualitative predictions,  and has not tried to explain 
just about everything that occurs in the family. 
VI. Summary 
.~heories  are applicaple only within a restricted domain,  and 
their success within that domain does not justify conclusions 
drawn from them in areas outside the domain for which they have 
been confirmed. And in establishing the domain of theories the 
realism of assumptions plays an important role. While it is 
possible to list a set of factors that help to determine the domain of the rationality assumption,  a comparison of efficient 
market theory with the economics of the family shows that one 
must also consider carefully the way the theory has been 
confirmed. 
Endnotes 
*  I am indebted for helpful comments to Tom Russell and to 
participants in the Conference on Philosophy,  Methodology and 
Economics at the University of New Hampshire. 
1. Some notable exceptions are Gary Becker, Thomas Russell and 
-Richard Zeckhauser.  A philosopher of science, the late Richard 
Rudner, once remarked that a major difference between the 
physical and the social sciences is the extent to which the 
former demarcate the domain of their hypothesis. 
2.  The argument that the greater ability to experiment accounts 
for the greater success of the natural sciences is usually 
countered by saying that astronomy, cosmology and evolutionary 
biology also cannot experiment. But that is not compelling. 
While astronomy and cosmology cannot experiment themselves, they 
can rely on the experimental results generated in physics and 
chemistry. And evolutionary biology, is hardly among the more 
solidly established natural sciences. If all natural sciences 
were like evolutionary biology their prestige would not exceed 
the prestige of economics by as much as it does, if at all. 
3. It may not be realistic to ask the original proponents of a 
theory or hypothesis to establish its limits,  but subsequent 
researchers should do so. 
4.  Thus a psychologist and political scientist Robert Abelson 
(1995, p. 34 writes: "in  correcting for the near-sighted view 
that human behavior is unremitting,  selfish instrumentalism,  the 
first step is to acknowledge that this position has boundaries. 
The second step is to identify those boundaries empirically and 
theoretically. ..." 
.  5. Some degree of rationa1it.y is obviously the norm, and 
hence a hypothesis khat requires that agents have only a limited 
degree of rationality also makes what may be a strong assumption. 
But such a hypothesis is unusual.  Usually if the hypothesis is 
correct given a certain degree of rationality it is correct also if 
agents are more rational. 
6.  To some extent the common reluctance to believe that economic 
theory can explain factors such as divorce,  crime, etc.,  may be 
due to an illusion. We know from personal observation that 
individual characteristics,  such as a capacity for love and a 
conscience inculcated in childhood, are major determinants of the 
propensity to seek a divorce, or to commit a crime,  so that not 18 
much room is left for economic determinants.  That is true on the 
individual level, but when we aggregate and look at large 
populations these individual idiosyncrasies cancel out. 
7.  However in terms of the agent's  welfare decisions are often 
larger in some of these markets than in security markets.  For 
most people an unwise marriage has more important consequences 
than any single action they take in the security markets. 
8.  For a summary of work on discrimination, crime and the family 
see Becker  (1993).  Miller  (1997)  summarizes  the influence of 
economics on political science. For a survey of the debate about 
the applicability of the rational actor model to political 
science see the Winter-Spring 1995 issue of the Critical Review, 
and its summary by Friedman (1995)  . REFERENCES 
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